Auctions: Theory and Practice by Paul Klemperer
COPYRIGHT NOTICE:
For COURSE PACK and other PERMISSIONS, refer to entry on previous page. For
more information, send e-mail to permissions@pupress.princeton.edu
University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form
by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information 
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading 
and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any 
network servers.
is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2004, by Princeton
Paul Klemperer: Auctions: Theory and Practice CHAPTER THREE
What Really Matters in Auction Design*
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of
competition policy—preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring beha-
vior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these
problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction—a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending
auctions—may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable ﬁas-
coes in auctioning, mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity,
etc., and especially the European ‘‘third-generation’’ (UMTS) spectrum
auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction
design is not ‘‘one size ﬁts all’’.
3.1 Introduction
Auctions have became enormously popular in recent years. Governments are
now especially keen, using auctions to sell mobile-phone licenses, to operate
decentralized electricity markets, and to privatize companies, etc. And the
growth of e-commerce has led to many business-to-business auctions for
goods whose trade was previously negotiated bilaterally.
Economists are proud of their role in pushing for auctions; for example,
Coase (1959) was among the ﬁrst to advocate auctioning radio spectrum. But
many auctions—including some designed with the help of leading academic
economists—have worked very badly.
For example, six European countries auctioned off spectrum licenses for
‘‘third-generation’’ mobile phones in 2000. In Germany and the United King-
dom, the spectrum sold for over 600 euros per person ($80 billion in all, or
over 2 percent of GDP). But in Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland
the revenues were just 100, 170, 240 and 20 euros per person, respectively.
(See chapter 5.) To be sure, investors became more skeptical about the under-
lying value of the spectrum during 2000 (and they are even more skeptical
today). But this is just a fraction of the story. The Netherlands auction was
sandwiched between the UK and German auctions, and analysts and govern-
ment ofﬁcials predicted revenues in excess of 400 euros per person from the
Italian and Swiss auctions just a few days before they began (Michelson, 2000;
* This chapter was originally published under its current title in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives 2002, 16, 169–189. I am very grateful to many colleagues including Sushil Bikh-
chandani, Nils-Henrik von der Fehr, Tim Harford, Emiel Maasland, Margaret Meyer, Mike
Rothkopf, David Salant, Rebecca Stone, Tim Taylor, Chuck Thomas, Tommaso Valletti,
Michael Waldman, Mark Williams, and especially my co-authors Jeremy Bulow and Marco
Pagnozzi, for helpful advice on this chapter.Roberts, 2000; Total Telecom, 2000; and chapter 5). These other auctions
were ﬁascoes primarily because they were poorly designed.
So what makes a successful auction?
What really matters in auction design are the same issues that any industry
regulator would recognize as key concerns: discouraging collusive, entry-
deterring and predatory behavior. In short, good auction design is mostly
good elementary economics.
By contrast, most of the extensive auction literature (summarized in, e.g.,
chapter 1 and Klemperer, 2000a) is of second-order importance for practical
auction design. The literature largely focuses on a ﬁxed number of bidders
who bid non-cooperatively, and it emphasizes issues such as the effects of risk
aversion, correlation of information, budget constraints, complementarities,
etc. Auction theorists have made important progress on these topics which
other economic theory has beneﬁted from, and auction theory has also been
fruitfully applied in political economy, ﬁnance, law and economics, labor
economics, industrial organization, etc. often in contexts not usually thought
of as auctions (see chapter 2). But most of this literature is of much less use for
actually designing auctions.
This chapter lists and gives examples of some critical pitfalls in auction
design, and discusses what to do about them. We show that ascending and
uniform-price auctions are both very vulnerable to collusion, and very likely
to deter entry into an auction. We consider including a ﬁnal sealed-bid stage
into an otherwise ascending auction to create an ‘‘Anglo-Dutch’’ auction, and
emphasize the need for stronger antitrust policy in auction markets.
3.2 Collusion
A ﬁrst major set of concerns for practical auction design involves the risk that
participants may explicitly or tacitly collude to avoid bidding up prices.
Consider a multi-unit (simultaneous) ascending auction. (This is just like the
standard auction used, for example, to sell a painting in Sotheby’s or Chris-
ties—the price starts low and competing bidders raise the price until no one is




use the early stages when prices are still low to signal who should win which
objects, and then tacitly agree to stop pushing prices up.
For example,in 1999Germany sold ten blocks of spectrumbya simultaneous
ascending auction with the rule that any new bid on a block had to exceed the
previoushighbidbyatleast10percent.Mannesman’sﬁrstbidswere18.18million
deutschmarks(DM)permegahertzonblocks1–5and20millionDMperMHzon
104 CHAPTER THREEblocks 6–10; the only other credible bidder—T-Mobil—b i de v e nl e s si nt h eﬁrst
round. One of T-Mobil’s managers then said. ‘‘There were no agreements with
Mannesman. But [T-Mobil] interpreted Mannesman’s ﬁrst bid as an offer’’
(Stuewe, 1999, p. 13). The point is that 18.18 plus a 10 percent raise equals
approximately 20. It seems T-Mobil understood that if it bid 20 million DM per
MHz on blocks 1–5, but did not bid again on blocks 6–10, the two companies
would then live and let live with neither company challenging the other on the
other’s half. Exactly that happened. So the auction closed after just two rounds
with each of the bidders acquiring half the blocks for the same low price (Jehiel
and Moldovanu, 2001b; Grimm, Riedel, and Wolfstetter, 2003).
Ascending auctions can also facilitate collusion by offering a mechanism
for punishing rivals. The threat of punishment may be implicit; for example, it
was clear to T-Mobil that Mannesman would retaliate with high bids on blocks
1–5 if T-Mobil continued bidding on blocks 6–10. But an ascending auction
can also allow more explicit options for punishment.
In a multi-license US spectrum auction in 1996–97, U.S. West was compet-
ing vigorously with McLeod for lot number 378—a license in Rochester,
Minnesota. Although most bids in the auction had been in exact thousands
of dollars, U.S. West bid $313,378 and $62,378 for two licenses in Iowa in
which it had earlier shown no interest, overbidding McLeod who had seemed
to be the uncontested high bidder for these licenses. McLeod got the point that
it was being punished for competing in Rochester, and dropped out of that
market. Since McLeod made subsequent higher bids on the Iowa licenses, the
‘‘punishment’’ bids cost U.S. West nothing (Cramton and Schwartz, 2002).
A related phenomenon can arise in one special kind of sealed-bid auction,
namely a uniform-price auction in which each bidder submits a sealed bid
stating what price it would pay for different quantities of a homogenous good,
for example, electricity (i.e., it submits a demand function), and then the good
is sold at the single price determined by the lowest winning bid. In this format,
bidders can submit bids that ensure that any deviation from a (tacit or explicit)
collusive agreement is severely punished: each bidder bids very high prices for
smaller quantities than its collusively agreed share. Then if any bidder
attempts to obtain more than its agreed share (leaving other ﬁrms with less
than their agreed shares), all bidders will have to pay these very high prices.
However, if everyone sticks to their agreed shares then these very high prices
will never need to be paid. So deviation from the collusive agreement is
unproﬁtable.
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1 Since, with many units, the lowest winning bid in a uniform-price auction is typically not
importantly different from the highest losing bid, this auction is analogous to an ascending auction
(in which every winner pays the runner-up’s willingness-to-pay). The ‘‘threats’’ that support
collusion in a uniform-price auction are likewise analogous to the implicit threats supporting
collusion in an ascending auction. Collusion in a uniform-price auction is harder if supply is
uncertain since this reduces the number of points on the bid schedule that are inframarginal and
can be used as threats (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Back and Zender, 1993, 2001).
105The electricity regulator in the United Kingdom believes the market in
which distribution companies purchase electricity from generating companies
has fallen prey to exactly this kind of ‘‘implicit collusion’’ (Ofﬁce of Gas and
Electricity Markets, 1999, pp. 173–174). ‘‘Far from being the success story
trumpeted around the world, the story of the UK generation market and the
development of competition has been something of a disaster’’ (Power U.K.,
issue 66, 31 August 1999, p. 14; see also von der Fehr and Harbord, 1998;
Newbery, 1998; Wolfram, 1998, 1999). In addition, a frequently repeated
auction market such as that for electricity is particularly vulnerable to collu-
sion, because the repeated interaction among bidders expands the set of signal-
ing and punishment strategies available to them, and allows them to learn to
cooperate.
Much of the kind of behavior discussed so far is hard to challenge legally.
Indeed, trying to outlaw it all would require cumbersome rules that restrict
bidders’ﬂ exibility and might generate inefﬁciencies, without being fully effec-
tive.Itwouldbemuchbettertosolvetheseproblemswithbetterauctiondesigns.
3.3 Entry Deterrence and Predation
The second major area of concern of practical auction design is to attract
bidders, since an auction with too few bidders risks being unproﬁtable for
the auctioneer (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) and potentially inefﬁcient.
Ascending auctions are often particularly poor in this respect, since they
can allow some bidders to deter the entry, or depress the bidding, of rivals.
In an ascending auction, there is a strong presumption that the ﬁrm which
values winning the most will be the eventual winner, because even if it is
outbid at an early stage, it can eventually top any opposition. As a result, other
ﬁrms have little incentive to enter the bidding, and may not do so if they have
even modest costs of bidding.
Consider, for example, Glaxo’s 1995 takeover of the Wellcome drugs
company. After Glaxo’s ﬁrst bid of 9 billion pounds, Zeneca expressed will-
ingness to offer about 10 billion pounds if it could be sure of winning, while
Roche considered an offer of 11 billion pounds. But certain synergies made
Wellcome worth a little more to Glaxo than to the other ﬁrms, and the costs of
bidding were tens of millions of pounds. Eventually, neither Roche nor Zeneca
actually entered the bidding, and Wellcome was sold at the original bid of
9 billion pounds, literally a billion or two less than its shareholders might have
received. Wellcome’s own chief executive admitted ‘‘…there was money left
on the table’’ (Wighton, 1995a,b).
While ascending auctions are particularly vulnerable to lack of entry, other
auction forms can result in similar problems if the costs of entry and the
asymmetries between bidders are too large.
106 CHAPTER THREEThe 1991 UK sale of TV franchises by a sealed-bid auction is a dramatic
example. While the regions in the South and South East, South West, East,
Wales, and West, North East, and Yorkshire all sold in the range 9.36 to
15.88 pounds per head of population, the only—and therefore winning—bid
for the Midlands region was made by the incumbent ﬁrm and was just one-
twentieth of one penny (!) per head of population. Much the same happened in
Scotland, where the only bidder for the Central region generously bid one-
seventh of one penny per capita. What had happened was that bidders were
required to provide very detailed region-speciﬁc programming plans. In each
of these two regions, the only bidder had ﬁgured out that no one else had
developed such a plan.
2
Another issue that can depress bidding in some ascending auctions is the
‘‘winner’s curse’’. This applies when bidders have the same, or close to the
same, actual value for a prize, but they have different information about that
actual value (what auction theorists call the ‘‘common values’’ case). The
winner’s curse reﬂects the danger that the winner of an auction is likely to
be the party who has most greatly overestimated the value of the prize. Know-
ing about the winner’s curse will cause everyone to bid cautiously. But weaker
ﬁrms must be especially cautious, since they must recognize that they are only
likely to win when they have overestimated the value by even more than usual.
Therefore, an advantaged ﬁrm can be less cautious, since beating very
cautious opponents need not imply one has overestimated the prize’s value.
Because the winner’s curse affects weak ﬁrms much more than strong ones,
and because the effect is self-reinforcing, the advantaged bidder wins most of
the time. And because its rivals bid extremely cautiously, it also generally
pays a low price when it does win (Klemperer, 1998).
The bidding on the Los Angeles license in the 1995 US auction for mobile-
phone broadband licenses illustrates this problem. While the license’s value
was hard toestimate, it was probably worth similar amounts to several bidders.
But Paciﬁc Telephone, which already operated the local ﬁxed-line telephone
business in California, had distinct advantages from its database on potential
local customers, its well-known brand name, and its familiarity with doing
business in California. The auction was an ascending auction. And the result
was that the bidding stopped at a very low price. In the end, the Los Angeles
license yielded only $26 per capita. In Chicago, by contrast, the main local
ﬁxed-lineproviderwasineligibletocompeteanditwasnotobviouswhowould
win,sotheauctionyielded$31percapitaeventhoughChicagowasthoughtless
valuable than Los Angeles because of its lower household incomes, lower
expected population growth, and more dispersed population (Klemperer,
1998;BulowandKlemperer,2002).Forbroader,formaleconometricevidence
for the FCC auctions, see Klemperer and Pagnozzi (forthcoming).
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2 While I have advised the UK government on several auctions, I have never had anything to do
with TV licenses!
107Ofcourse,the‘‘winner’scurse’’ problemexacerbatestheproblemthatweaker
bidders may not bother to participate in an ascending auction. GTE and Bell
AtlanticmadedealsthatmadethemineligibletobidfortheLosAngeleslicense,
and MCI failed to enter this auction at all. Similarly, takeover battles are essen-
tiallyascendingauctions,andthereisempiricalevidencethataﬁrmthatmakesa
takeover bid has a lower risk of facing a rival bidder if the ﬁrm has a larger
shareholding or ‘‘toehold’’ in the target company (Betton and Eckbo, 1995).
Because outcomes in an ascending auction can be dramatically inﬂuenced
by a seemingly modest advantage, developing such an advantage can be an
effective way to predate on rivals. An apparent example was the 1999 attempt
by BSkyB (Rupert Murdoch’s satellite television company) to acquire
Manchester United (England’s most successful soccer club). The problem
was the advantage this would give BSkyB in the auction offootball TV rights.
Since Manchester United receives 7 percent of the Premier League’sT V
revenues, BSkyB would have received 7 percent of the price of the league’s
broadcasting rights, whoever won them. So BSkyB would have had an incen-
tive to bid more aggressively in an ascending auction to push up the price of
the rights, and knowing this, other potential bidders would have faced a worse
‘‘winner’s curse’’ and backed off. BSkyB might have ended up with a lock
over the TV rights with damaging effects on the TV market more generally.
Largely for this reason the UK Government blocked the acquisition.
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A strong bidder also has an incentive to create a reputation for aggressive-
ness that reinforces its advantage. For example, when Glaxo was bidding for
Wellcome, it made it clear that it ‘‘would almost certainly top a rival bid’’
(Wighton, 1995b). Similarly, before bidding for the California phone license,
Paciﬁc Telephone announced in the Wall Street Journal that ‘‘if somebody
takes California away from us, they’ll never make any money’’ (Cauley and
Carnevale, 1994, p. A4). Paciﬁc Telephone also hired one of the world’s most
prominent auction theorists to give seminars to the rest of the industry to
explain the winner’s curse argument that justiﬁes this statement, and rein-
forced the point in full page ads that it ran in the newspapers of the cities
where their major competitors were headquartered (Koselka, 1995, p. 63). It
also made organizational changes that demonstrated its commitment to
winning the Los Angeles license.
Predation may be particularly easy in repeated ascending auctions, such as,
for example, in a series of spectrum auctions. A bidder who buys assets that
are complementary to assets for sale in a future auction, or simply bids very
aggressively in early auctions, can develop a reputation for aggressiveness
(Bikhchandani, 1988). Potential rivals in future auctions will both be less
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3 Although the term ‘‘toehold effect’’ coined by Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999), and
Klemperer (1998) in the related context of takeover battles (see above) entered the popular
press, and these papers were cited by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1999) report
which effectively decided the issue, neither I nor my co-authors had any involvement in this case.willing to participate, and bid less aggressively if they do participate. Even in
the absence of predation, weaker bidders learn that they are weaker and
became reluctant to enter future ascending auctions (see section 5.7.2).
Finally, because an ascending auction often effectively blocks the entry of
‘‘weaker’’ bidders, it encourages ‘‘stronger’’ bidders to bid jointly or to
collude; after all, they know that no one else can enter the auction to steal
the collusive rents they create. In the disastrous November 2000 Swiss sale of
four third-generation mobile-phone licenses, there was considerable initial
interest from potential bidders. But weaker bidders were put off by the auction
form—at least one company hired bidding consultants and then gave up after
learning that the ascending-bidding rules would give the company very little
chance against stronger rivals. Moreover, the government permitted last-
minute joint-bidding agreements—essentially ofﬁcially sanctioned collusion.
In the week before the auction, the ﬁeld shrank from nine bidders to just four
bidders for the four licenses! Since no bidder was allowed to take more than
one license, the sale price was determined by the reserve price which was just
one-thirtieth of the UK and German per capita revenues, and one-ﬁftieth of
what the Swiss had once hoped for!
3.4 Other Pitfalls
3.4.1 Reserve Prices
Many of the disasters above were greatly aggravated by failure to set a proper
reserve price (the minimum amount the winner is required to pay). Take the
last example. It was ridiculous for the Swiss government to set its reserve at
just one-thirtieth of the per capita revenue raised by the German and UK
governments for similar properties. Since the government’s own spokesman
predicted just ﬁve days prior to the auction that twenty times the reserve price
would be raised, what was the government playing at?
Inadequatereservesalsoincreasetheincentivesforpredationandmayencou-
rage collusion that would not otherwise have been in all bidders’ interests. A
stronger bidder in an ascending auction has a choice between either tacitly
colluding to end the auction quickly at a low price, or forcing the price up to
driveoutweakerbidders.Thelowerthereservepriceatwhichtheauctioncanbe
concluded, the more attractive is the ﬁrst option—this factor may have been an
important contributor to several of the ﬁascoes we have discussed.
3.4.2 Political Problems
Serious reserve prices are often opposed not only by industry groups, but also
by government ofﬁcials for whom the worstoutcome is that the reserve price is
not met so the object is not sold and the auction is seen as a ‘‘failure’’.
WHAT REALLY MATTERS IN AUCTION DESIGN 109Similarly, standard (ﬁrst-price) sealed-bid auctions—in which the bidders
simultaneously make ‘‘best and ﬁnal’’ offers, and the winner pays the price he
bid—can sometimes be very embarrassing for bidders, as BSCH (Spain’s
biggest bank) found out when Brazil privatized the Sao Paulo state bank
Banespa. When the bids were opened, BSCH’s managers were horriﬁed to
learn that their bid of over 7 million Reals ($3.6 billion) was more than three
times the runner-up’s bid, and that they were therefore paying 5 billion Reals
($2.5 billion) more than was needed to win. In other auctions, meanwhile,
losers who have just narrowly underbid the winners have found it equally hard
to explain themselves to their bosses and shareholders. So ﬁrms, or at least
their managers, can oppose ﬁrst-price auctions.
On the other hand, a second-price sealed-bid auction—in which the winner
pays the runner-up’s bid—can be embarrassing for the auctioneer if the
winner’s actual bid is revealed to be far more than the runner-up’s, even if
the auction was ex-ante both efﬁcient and revenue maximizing. McMillan
(1994) reports a second-price New Zealand auction in which the winner bid
NZ $7 million but paid the runner-up’s bid of NZ $5,000. Of course, New
Zealand should have set a minimum reserve price that the winner had to pay,
but even if that had been politically possible, the winner would probably have
bid more than it had to pay, so this might have been an economically but not
politically sensible auction.
3.4.3 Loopholes
In some cases, the auction rules may leave gaping loopholes for behavior to
game the auction. In 2000, Turkey auctioned two telecom licenses sequen-
tially, with an additional twist that set the reserve price for the second license
equal to the selling price of the ﬁrst. One ﬁrm then bid far more for the ﬁrst
license than it could possibly be worth if the ﬁrm had to compete in the
telecom market with a rival holding the second license. But the ﬁrm had
rightly ﬁgured that no rival would be willing to bid that high for the second
license, which therefore remained unsold, leaving the ﬁrm without a rival
operating the second license!
As another example, McMillan (1994) reports an Australian auction for
satellite-television licenses in which two bidders each made large numbers
of different sealed bids on the same objects and then, after considerable delays,
defaulted on those bids they did not like after the fact—since the government
had neglected to impose any penalties for default. More recently, the US
spectrum auctions have been plagued by bidders ‘‘winning’’ licenses and
subsequently defaulting on their commitments, often after long delays.
(India also recently fell into the same trap.) If default costs are small, then
bidders are bidding for options on prizes rather than the prizes themselves.
Furthermore, if smaller, underﬁnanced ﬁrms can avoid commitments through
110 CHAPTER THREEbankruptcy, then an auction actually favors these bidders over better-ﬁnanced
competitors who cannot default.
3.4.4 Credibility of the Rules
It may not be credible for the auctioneer to punish a bidder violating the
auction rules when just one bidder needs to be eliminated to end an auction,
because excluding the offending bidder would end the auction immediately,
and it might be hard to impose ﬁnes large enough to have a serious deterrent
effect. Fines of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars might have
been required to deter improper behavior in some of the European third-
generation mobile-phone license auctions. In the Netherlands sale, for exam-
ple, six bidders competed for ﬁve licenses in an ascending auction in which
bidders were permitted to win just one license each. One bidder, Telfort, sent a
letter to another, Versatel, threatening legal action for damages if Versatel
continued to bid! Telfort claimed that Versatel ‘‘believes that its bids will
always be surpassed by [others’…so it] must be that Versatel is attempting to
either raise its competitors’ costs or to get access to their … networks’’, but
many observers felt Telfort’s threats against Versatel were outrageous.
However, the government took no action—not even an investigation. As a
result, Versatel quit the auction and the sale raised less than 30 percent of what
the Dutch government had forecast based on the results of the United King-
dom’s similar auction just three months earlier.
Ascendingauctionsareparticularlyvulnerable to rulebreakingbythebidders
since they necessarily pass through a stage where there is just one (or a few)
excess bidders, and the ascending structure allows a cheat time to assess the
success ofits strategy. Sealed-bid auctions, bycontrast, may bemorevulnerable
to rule changing by the auctioneer. For example, excuses for not accepting a
winning bid can often be found if losing bidders are willing to bid higher. The
famous RJR-Nabisco sale went through several supposedly ﬁnal sealed-bid
auctions (Burrough and Helyar, 1990). But if, after a sealed-bid auction, the
auctioneer can re-open the auction to higher offers, the auction is really an
ascending-bid auction and needs to be recognized as such. In fact, genuine
sealed-bid auctions may be difﬁcult to run in takeover battles, especially since
a director who turns down a higher bid for his company after running a ‘‘sealed-
bid auction’’ may be vulnerable to shareholder lawsuits.
Sealed-bid auctions can also be especially hard to commit to if the auction-
eer has any association with a bidder as, for example, would have been the
case in the UK football TV-rights auction discussed earlier if BSkyB (a
bidder) had taken over Manchester United (an inﬂuential member of the foot-
ball league which was the auctioneer).
Committing to future behavior may be a particular problem for govern-
ments. For example, it may be difﬁcult to auction a license if the regulatory
WHAT REALLY MATTERS IN AUCTION DESIGN 111regime may change, but binding future governments (or even the current
government) to a particular regulatory regime may prove difﬁcult.
The credibility of reserve prices is of special importance. If a reserve price
is not a genuine commitment to not sell an object if it does not reach its
reserve, then it has no meaning and bidders will treat it as such. For example,
returning to the Turkish tale of woe, the government is now considering new




In some auctions, for example of mobile-phone licenses, the structure of the
industry that will be created cannot be ignored by the auction designer. It is
tempting to simply ‘‘let the market decide’’ the industry structure by auction-
ing many small packages of spectrum, which individual ﬁrms can aggregate
into larger licenses. But the auction’s outcome is driven by bidders’ proﬁts, not
by the welfare of consumers or society as a whole.
The most obvious possible distortion is that since ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts in the
telecom market are generally greater the fewer competitors there are in the
market, it is worth more to any group ofﬁrms to prevent entry of an additional
ﬁrm than the additional ﬁrm is willing to pay to enter. So too few ﬁrms may
win spectrum, and these winners may each win too much, exactly as a ‘‘hands-
off’’ policy to merger control will tend to create an overly concentrated
industry. The Turkish ﬁasco discussed earlier was a spectacular example of
how an auction can be biased towards generating monopoly.
5
But this outcome is not the only socially suboptimal possibility. A ﬁrm with
a large demand may prefer to reduce its demand to end the auction at a low
price, rather than raise the price to drive out its rivals, even when the latter
course would be socially more efﬁcient (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998a). There
can also be too many winners if ﬁrms collude to divide the spoils at a low
price. In the Austrian third-generation mobile spectrum sale, for example, six
ﬁrms competed for twelve identical lots in an ascending auction and not
surprisingly seemed to agree to divide the market so each ﬁrm won two lots
each at not much more than the very low reserve price. Perhaps six winners
was the efﬁcient outcome. But we certainly cannot tell from the behavior in the
auction. (It was rumored that the bidding lasted only long enough to create
some public perception of genuine competition and reduce the risk of the
government changing the rules.)
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4 Re-auctioning with a lower reserve price after a delay may sometimes be sensible, to allow
further entry if there are high costs of entering the auction (Burguet and Sa ´kovics, 1996; McAfee
and McMillan, 1988), but in this case the auctioneer should make clear in advance what he would
do if the reserve is not met.
5 Similarly, the Greek second-generation spectrum auction in July 2001 led to a more concen-
trated telecom market than seems likely to be socially efﬁcient.So it may sometimes be wiser to predetermine the number of winners by
auctioning off fewer, larger, licenses, but limiting bidders to one license
apiece, rather than to auction many licenses and to allow bidders to buy as
many as they wish.
3.4.6 When Is Auction Design Less Important?
The fact that collusion and entry deterrence and, more generally, buyer market
power is the key to auction problems suggests that auction design may not
matter very much when there is a large number of potential bidders for whom
entry to the auction is easy. For example, though much ink has been spilt on
the subject of government security sales, auction design may not matter much
for either price or efﬁciency in this case. Indeed the US Treasury’s recent
experiments with different kinds of auctions yielded inconclusive results
(Simon, 1994; Malvey, Archibald and Flynn, 1996; Nyborg and Sundaresan
1996; Reinhart and Belzar, 1996; Ausubel and Cramton 1998a), and the
broader empirical literature is also inconclusive. Of course, even small differ-
ences in auction performance can be signiﬁcant when such large amounts of
money are involved, and collusion has been an issue in some government-
security sales, so further research is still warranted.
6
3.5 Solutions
3.5.1 Making the Ascending Auction More Robust
Much of our discussion has emphasized the vulnerability of ascending
auctions to collusion and predatory behavior. However, ascending auctions
have several virtues, as well. An ascending auction is particularly likely to
allocate the prizes to the bidders who value them the most, since a bidder with
a higher value always has the opportunity to rebid to top a lower-value bidder
who may initially have bid more aggressively.
7 Moreover, if there are comple-
mentarities between the objects for sale, a multi-unit ascending auction makes
it more likely that bidders will win efﬁcient bundles than in a pure sealed-bid
WHAT REALLY MATTERS IN AUCTION DESIGN
6 These views are personal; I have advised UK government agencies on the related issue of the
sale of gold.
7 This applies in many ‘‘common values’’ and ‘‘private values’’ settings (Maskin, 1992), but is
not necessarily the same as maximizing efﬁciency; when bidders are ﬁrms, it ignores consumer
welfare (which is likely to favor a more widely dispersed ownership than ﬁrms would choose) and,
of course, it ignores government revenue. We assume governments (as well as other auctioneers)
care about revenue because of the substantial deadweight losses (perhaps 33 cents per dollar
raised) of raising government funds through alternative methods (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley,
1985). Resale is not a perfect substitute for an efﬁcient initial allocation, because even costless
resale cannot usually ensure an efﬁcient outcome in the presence of incomplete information
(Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer, 1987).
113auction in which they can learn nothing about their opponents’ intentions.
Allowing bidders to learn about others’ valuations during the auction can
also make the bidders more comfortable with their own assessments and
less cautious, and often raises the auctioneer’s revenues if information is
‘‘afﬁliated’’ in the sense of Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
A number of methods to make the ascending auction more robust are clear
enough. For example, bidders can be forced to bid ‘‘round’’ numbers, the exact
increments can be prespeciﬁed, and bids can be made anonymous. These steps
make it harder to use bids to signal other buyers. Lots can be aggregated into
larger packages to make it harder for bidders to divide the spoils, and keeping
secret the number of bidders remaining in the auction also makes collusion
harder (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000; Salant, 2000). Ausubel’s (1998)
suggested modiﬁcation of the ascending auction mitigates the incentive of
bidders to reduce their demands in order to end the auction quickly at a low
price. Sometimes it is possible to pay bidders to enter an auction; for example,
‘‘white knights’’ can be offered options to enter a takeover battle against an
advantaged bidder.
But while these measures can be useful, they do not eliminate the risks of
collusion or of too few bidders. An alternative is to choose a different type of
auction.
3.5.2 Using Sealed-bid Auctions
In a standard sealed-bid auction (or ‘‘ﬁrst-price’’ sealed-bid auction), each
bidder simultaneously makes a single ‘‘best and ﬁnal’’ offer. As a result,
ﬁrms are unable to retaliate against bidders who fail to cooperate with
them, so collusion is much harder than in an ascending auction. Tacit collusion
is particularly difﬁcult since ﬁrms are unable to use the bidding to signal. True,
both signaling and retaliation are possible in a series of sealed-bid auctions,
but collusion is still usually harder than in a series of ascending auctions.
From the perspective of encouraging more entry, the merit of a sealed-bid
auction is that the outcome is much less certain than in an ascending auction.
Anadvantaged bidder will probably win a sealed-bid auction, but it must make
its single ﬁnal offer in the face of uncertainty about its rivals’ bids, and because
it wants to get a bargain its sealed-bid will not be the maximum it could be
pushed to in an ascending auction. So ‘‘weaker’’ bidders have at least some
chance of victory, even when they would surely lose an ascending auction
(Vickrey, 1961, Appendix III). It follows that potential entrants are likely to be
more willing to enter a sealed-bid auction than an ascending auction.
Asealed-bidauctionmightevenencouragebidderswhoenteronlyin order to
resell, further increasing the competitiveness of the auction. Such bidders seem
less likely to enter an ascending auction, since it is generally more difﬁcult to
proﬁtf r o mr e s e l l i n gt oﬁrms one has beaten in an ascending auction.
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discourage consortia from forming. If the strong ﬁrms form a consortium, they
may simply attract other ﬁrms into the bidding in the hope of beating the
consortium. So strong ﬁrms are more likely to bid independently in a
sealed-bid auction, making this a much more competitive auction.
Consistent with all this, there is some evidence from timber sales that
sealed-bid auctions attract more bidders than ascending auctions do, and
that this makes sealed-bid auctions considerably more proﬁtable for the seller,
and this seems to be believed in this industry (Mead and Schneipp, 1989;
Rothkopf and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1993), even though conditional on the
number of bidders, sealed-bid auctions seem only slightly more proﬁtable than
ascending auctions (Hansen, 1986).
Furthermore, in the ‘‘common values’’ case in which bidders have similar
actual values for a prize, the ‘‘winner’s curse’’ problem for a weaker bidder
is far less severe in a sealed-bid auction. Winning an ascending auction
means the weaker bidder is paying a price his rival is unwilling to match—
which should make the weaker bidder very nervous. But the weaker player
has a chance of winning a sealed-bid auction at a price the stronger rival
would be willing to match, but did not. Since beating the stronger player is
not necessarily bad news in a sealed-bid auction, the weaker player can bid
more aggressively. So auction prices will be higher, even for a given
number of bidders (Klemperer, 1998; Bulow, Huang and Klemperer,
1999).
8
But while sealed-bid auctions have many advantages, they are not with-
out ﬂaws. Mainly, by giving some chance of victory to weaker bidders,
sealed-bid auctions are less likely than ascending auctions to lead to efﬁ-
cient outcomes. Moreover, in standard sealed-bid auctions in which winners
pay their own bids, bidders need to have good information about the distri-
bution of their rivals’ values to bid intelligently (Persico, 2000b). By
contrast, in an ascending or uniform-price auction the best strategy of a
bidder who knows his own value is just to bid up to that value, and
winners’ payments are determined by non-winners’ bids. So ‘‘pay-your-
bid’’ sealed-bid auctions may discourage potential bidders who have only
small amounts to trade and for whom the costs of obtaining market infor-
mation might not be worth paying. For example, in March 2001 the UK
electricity regulator replaced the problematic uniform-price auction we
described earlier by an exchange market followed by a ‘‘pay-your-bid’’
sealed-bid auction, which makes collusion harder because bids can no
longer be used as costless threats. But a major concern is that the new
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8 In Milgrom and Weber’s (1982a) model, sealed-bid auctions are less proﬁtable than ascending
auctions if signals are ‘‘afﬁliated’’. But they assume symmetric bidders, and the effect does not
seem large in practice (Riley and Li, 1997). Sealed-bid auctions are generally more proﬁtable if
bidders are risk-averse or budget-constrained (see sections 1.5 and 1.13.1).
115trading arrangements may deter potential entrants from investing the sunk
costs necessary to enter the electricity market.
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However, the entry problem in many-unit auctions is much less serious if
small bidders can buy from larger intermediaries who can aggregate smaller
bidders’ demands and bid in their place as, for example, occurs in auctions of
treasury bills. And the entry problem is also alleviated if smaller bidders are
permitted to make ‘‘non-competitive bids’’, that is, to state demands for ﬁxed
quantities for which they pay the average winning price, as is also the case in
some treasury bill auctions.
3.5.3 The Anglo-Dutch Auction
A solution to the dilemma of choosing between the ascending (often called
‘‘English’’) and sealed-bid (or ‘‘Dutch’’) forms is to combine the two in a
hybrid, the ‘‘Anglo-Dutch’’, which often captures the best features of both,
and was ﬁrst described and proposed in Klemperer (1998). (See also sections
2.3.2 and 6.5.1.)
For simplicity, assume a single object is to be auctioned. In an Anglo-Dutch
auction the auctioneer begins by running an ascending auction in which price
is raised continuously until all but two bidders have dropped out. The two
remaining bidders are then each required to make a ﬁnal sealed-bid offer that
is not lower than the current asking price, and the winner pays his bid. The
process is much like the way houses are often sold, although unlike in many
house sales the procedure the auctioneer will follow in an Anglo-Dutch
auction is clearly speciﬁed in advance.
Another auction with similar features—and probably similar motivations to
the Anglo-Dutch—is W. R. Hambrecht’s OpenBook auction for corporate
bonds. The early bidding is public and ascending in style but bidders can
make ﬁnal sealed-bids in the last hour. Although all bidders are permitted
to make ﬁnal bids, higher bidders in the ﬁrst stages are given an advantage that
isevidentlylargeenough toinduceserious biddingearly on(Hall,2001,p. 71).
The process also has some similarity to auctions on eBay (by far the world’s
most successful e-commerce auctioneer) which are ascending price, but with a
ﬁxed ending time so that many bidders often bid only in the last few seconds in
essentially sealed-bid style. eBay attracts far more bidders than its rival,
Yahoo, which runs a standard ascending auction with a traditional ‘‘going,
going, gone’’ procedure that does not close the auction until there have been
no bids for 10 minutes.
The main value of the Anglo-Dutch procedure arises when one bidder (e.g.,
the incumbent operator of a license that is to be re-auctioned) is thought to be
stronger than potential rivals. Potential rivals might be unwilling to enter a
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9 Also, the new arrangements may not fully resolve the collusion problem anyway since the
market is so frequently repeated (Klemperer, 1999b).pure ascending-bid auction against the strong bidder, who would be perceived
to be a sure winner. But the sealed bid at the ﬁnal stage induces some uncer-
tainty about which of the two ﬁnalists will win, and entrants are attracted by
the knowledge that they have a chance to make it to this ﬁnal stage. So the
price may easily be higher even by the end of the ﬁrst, ascending, stage of the
Anglo-Dutch auction, than if a pure ascending auction were used.
The Anglo-Dutch auction should capture the other advantages of the sealed-
bid auction discussed in the previous section. Collusion will be discouraged
because the ﬁnal sealed-bid round allows ﬁrms to renege on any deals without
fear of retaliation, and because the Anglo-Dutch auction eliminates the stage
of the ascending auction when just one excess bidder remains, at which point
rules against collusion and predation may not be credible.
Consortium formation will also be discouraged. Imagine there are two
strong bidders for an item. In an ascending auction they are unlikely to be
challenged if they form a consortium so they have an incentive to do so. But in
an Anglo-Dutch auction, forming the consortium would open up an opportu-
nity for new entrants who would now have a chance to make it to the ﬁnal
sealed-bid stage. So the strong ﬁrms are much less likely to bid jointly.
But the Anglo-Dutch should also capture much of the beneﬁt of an ascend-
ing auction. It will be more likely to sell to the highest valuer than a pure
sealed-bid auction, both because it directly reduces the numbers allowed into
the sealed-bid stage and also because the two ﬁnalists can learn something
about each other’s and the remaining bidders’ perceptions of the object’s value
from behavior during the ascending stage.
When the Anglo-Dutch auction is extended to contexts in which individual
bidders are permitted to win multiple units and there are complementarities
between the objects, the ascending stage makes it more likely that bidders will
win efﬁcient bundles than in a pure sealed-bid auction.
Finally,IconjecturethattheascendingstagesoftheAnglo-Dutchauctionmay
extract most of the information that would be revealed by a pure ascending
auction, raising revenues if bidders’ information is ‘‘afﬁliated’’, while the
sealed-bid stage may do almost as well as a pure sealed-bid auction in capturing
extra revenue due tothe effects ofbidders’riskaversion, budgetconstraints, and
asymmetries.ThissuggeststheAnglo-Dutchauctionmayoutperformascending
and sealed-bid auctions even if it attracts no additional bidders.
In short, the Anglo-Dutch auction often combines the best of both the
ascending and the sealed-bid worlds.
3.5.4 Antitrust
Effective antitrust is critical to ﬁghting collusion and predation in auctions.
But antitrust enforcement seems much lighter than in ‘‘ordinary’’ economic
markets.
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status of many ofthe kinds of behaviordiscussed inthis chapter remains ambig-
uous,andcollusionintakeoverbattlesforcompaniesislegalintheUnitedStates.
European antitrust has been even weaker, as evidenced by T-Mobil’s will-
ingness to explicitly conﬁrm the signaling behavior described earlier. True,
when apparently similar behavior was observed in the more recent German
third-generation spectrum auction, ﬁrms refused to conﬁrm ofﬁcially that they
were signaling to rivals to end the auction. Even so, the Financial Times
reported: ‘‘One operator has privately admitted to altering the last digit of
its bid in a semi-serious attempt to signal to other participants that it was
willing to accept [fewer lots to end the auction]’’ (Roberts and Ward, 2000,
p. 21). This kind of signaling behavior could perhaps be challenged as an
abuse of ‘‘joint dominance’’ under EU and UK law. But European regulators
have showed no interest in pursuing such matters.
Firms are also permitted to make explicit statements about auctions that
would surely be unacceptable if made about a ‘‘normal’’ economic market.
For example, before the Austrian third-generation spectrum auction Telekom
Austria, the largest incumbent and presumably the strongest among the six
bidders, said it ‘‘would be satisﬁed with just 2 of the 12 blocks offrequency on
offer’’ and ‘‘if the [5 other bidders] behaved similarly it should be possible to
get the frequencies on sensible terms’’, but ‘‘it would bid for a 3rd block if one
of its rivals did’’ (Reuters, 31 October 2000). It seems inconceivable that a
dominant ﬁrm in a ‘‘normal’’ market would be allowed to make the equivalent
offer and threat that it ‘‘would be satisﬁed with a market share of just 1/6’’ and
‘‘if the other ﬁve ﬁrms also stick to 1/6 of the market each, it should be
possible to sell at high prices’’, but ‘‘it would compete aggressively for a
larger share, if any of its rivals aimed for more than 1/6’’.
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Just as damaging has been the European authorities’ acceptance of joint-
bidding agreements that are, in effect, open collusion. Combinations that are
arranged very close to the auction date (as in the example of Switzerland
discussed earlier) should be particularly discouraged since they give no
time for entrants to emerge to threaten the new coalition. One view is that
auction participants should generally be restricted to entities that exist when
the auctionis ﬁrst announced, although exceptions would clearly be necessary.
Theantitrustagencies’ responseto predation in auction marketshas alsobeen
feeble. Dominant bidders such as Glaxo and Pactel in the examples above are
apparently allowed to make open threats that they will punish new entrants. For
example, Glaxo’s letting it be known that it ‘‘would almost certainly top a rival
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10 Similarly,duringthe Germanthird-generation spectrumauction, MobilComtold a newspaper
that ‘‘should [Debitel] fail to secure a license [it could] become a ‘virtual network operator’ using
MobilCom’s network while saving on the cost of the license’’ (Benoit, 2000, p. 28). This translates
roughly to a ﬁrm in a ‘‘normal’’ market saying it ‘‘would supply a rival should it choose to exit the
market’’, but MobilCom’s remarks went unpunished.bid’’, would roughly translate to an incumbent ﬁrm in a ‘‘normal’’ economic
market saying it ‘‘would almost certainly undercut any new entrant’sp r i c e ’’.
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Regulators should take such threats seriously, and treat auction markets
more like ‘‘ordinary’’ economic markets.
3.6 Tailoring Auction Design to the Context
Good auction design is not ‘‘one size ﬁts all’’ and must be sensitive to the
details of the context. A good example of this—and of our other principles—is
afforded by the year 2000 European third-generation (UMTS) mobile phone
license auctions.
The United Kingdom, which ran the ﬁrst of these auctions, originally
planned to sell just four licenses.
12 In this case the presence of exactly four
incumbent operators who had the advantages of existing brand names and
networks suggested that an ascending auction might deter new ﬁrms from
bidding strongly in the auction, or even from entering at all. So the govern-
ment planned an Anglo-Dutch auction. An ascending stage would have
continued until just ﬁve bidders remained, after which the ﬁve survivors
would have made sealed-bids (required to be no lower than the current
price level) for the four licenses.
13 The design performed extremely well in
laboratory experiments in both efﬁciency and revenue generation.
But, when it became possible to sell ﬁve licenses, an ascending auction
made more sense. Because no bidder was permitted to win more than one
license, at least one license had to be sold to a new entrant. This would be a
sufﬁcient carrot to attract several new entrants in the UK context in which it
was very unclear which new entrant(s) might be successful.
14Because licenses
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11 Similarly, Paciﬁc Telephone’s remark that ‘‘if somebody takes California away from us,
they’ll never make any money’’ seems to correspond to threatening that ‘‘if anyone tries to
compete with us, we’ll cut the price until they lose money’’. And Paciﬁc Telephone’s hiring of
an auction theorist to explain the winner’s curse to competitors might correspond to hiring an
industrial economist to explain the theory of the difﬁculties of entering new markets to potential
entrants.
12 I was the principal auction theorist advising the UK government’s Radiocommunications
Agency, which designed and ran the recent UK mobile-phone license auction. Ken Binmore led
the team and supervised experiments testing the proposed designs. Other academic advisors
included Tilman Bo ¨rgers, Jeremy Bulow, Philippe Jehiel, and Joe Swierzbinski.
13 It was proposed that all four winners would pay the fourth-highest sealed bid. Since the
licenses were not quite identical, a ﬁnal simultaneous ascending stage would have followed to
allocate them more efﬁciently among the winners. The sealed-bid stage could be run using an
ascending mechanism that would hide the actual bids even from the auctioneer, if this would
reduce political problems. See Klemperer (1998), Radiocommunications Agency (1998a,b), and
section 6.5.1, for more details.
14 In large part this was because the United Kingdom ran the ﬁrst third-generation auction.
Going to market ﬁrst was a deliberate strategy of the auction team, and the sustained marketing
campaign was also important. The UK auction attracted 13 bidders who then learnt about others’
strengths, and none of the eight subsequent auctions had more than seven bidders.
119could not be divided, bidders could not collude to divide the market without
resort to side payments. So the problems of collusion and entry deterrence
were minimal, and a version of an ascending auction was therefore used for
efﬁciency reasons. The auction was widely judged a success; nine new
entrants bid strongly against the incumbents, creating intense competition
and record-breaking revenues of £22.5 billion ($34 billion).
The Netherlands’ sale came next. Their key blunder was to follow the actual
British design when they had an equal number (ﬁve) of incumbents and
licenses. It was not hard to predict (indeed prior to the auction, an early
draft of this paper, Klemperer, 2000b, quoted in the Dutch press and Maas-
land, 2000, did predict) that very few entrants would show up. Netherlands
antitrust policy was as dysfunctional as the auction design, allowing the
strongest potential entrants to make deals with incumbent operators. In the
end just one weak new entrant (Versatel) competed with the incumbents. As
we have already discussed, with just one excess bidder in an ascending auction
it was unsurprising when the weak bidder quit early amid allegations of
predation, at less than 30 percent of the per capita UK prices. Six months
later, the Dutch parliament began an investigation into the auction process.
A version of the Anglo-Dutch design would probably have worked better in
the Netherlands context. There are reasons to believe Versatel would have bid
higher in the sealed-bid stage than the price at which it quit the ascending
auction. And the fear of this would have made the incumbents bid higher.
Furthermore, the ‘‘hope and dream’’ that a sealed-bid stage gives weaker
bidders might have attracted more bidders and discouraged the formation of
the joint-bidding consortia.
The Italian government thought it had learned from the Netherlands ﬁasco.
It also chose roughly the UK design, but stipulated that if there were no more
‘‘serious’’ bidders (as deﬁned by prequaliﬁcation conditions) than licenses,
then the number of licenses could, and probably would be reduced. At ﬁrst
glance this seemed a clever way to avoid an uncompetitive auction but (as I
and others argued) the approach was fundamentally ﬂawed. First, it is
‘‘putting the cart before the horse’’ to create an unnecessarily concentrated
mobile-phone market in order to make an auction look good. Second, our
earlier discussion demonstrates that a rule that allows the possibility that
there will be just one more bidder than license does not guarantee a compe-
titive ascending auction! And it was clear that the number of likely entrants
into an ascending auction was much smaller than it had been for the United
Kingdom, in large part because weaker potential entrants had ﬁgured out
from the earlier auctions that they were weaker, and that they therefore had
little chance of winning such an auction. In the event, just six bidders
competed for ﬁve licenses and the auction ended amid allegations of collu-
sion after less than two days of bidding with per capita revenues below
40 percent of the UK level, about half the amount the government was
120 CHAPTER THREEexpecting. Again, an Anglo-Dutch or pure sealed-bid design would probably
have performed better.
Part D discusses all nine 2000–2001 western European spectrum auctions in
much more detail.
3.7 Conclusion
Much of what we have said about auction design is no more than an applica-
tion of standard antitrust theory. The key issues in both ﬁelds are collusion and
entry. The signaling and punishment strategies that support collusion in
auctions are familiar from ‘‘ordinary’’ industrial markets, as are ﬁrms’ verbal
encouragements to collude and the predatory threats they make. Our point that
even modest bidding costs may be a serious deterrent to potential bidders is
analogous to the industrial-organization point that the contestability of a
market is non-robust to even small sunk costs of entry. We also argued that
because an ascending auction is more likely than a sealed-bid auction to be
won by the strongest ﬁrm, the ascending auction may therefore be less attrac-
tive to bidders and so be less proﬁtable than a sealed-bid auction; this is just an
example of the standard industrial-organization argument that a market that is
in principle more competitive (e.g., ‘‘Bertrand’’ rather than ‘‘Cournot’’) is less
attractive to enter, so may in fact be less competitive. A particular feature of
auction markets is that ‘‘winner’s curse’’ effects may mean that sealed-bid and
Anglo-Dutch auctions not only attract more ﬁrms than ascending auctions, but
may also lead to better outcomes for the auctioneer for a given number of
ﬁrms. But there is no justiﬁcation for the current feebleness of antitrust policy
in auction markets: regulators should treat them much more like ‘‘ordinary’’
economic markets.
However, none of our examples of auction failures should be taken as an
argument against auctions in general. Most auctions work extremely well.
Occasionally—for example, when there are too few potential bidders, or
large costs of supplying necessary information to bidders—a form of struc-
tured negotiations may be better, but an auction is usually more attractive to
potential buyers who are crucial to a sale’s success (Bulow and Klemperer,
1996). And even relatively unsuccessful auctions, such as the Netherlands and
Italian spectrum auctions we discussed, were probably more successful than
the ‘‘beauty contest’’ administrative hearings used to allocate third-generation
spectrum in several other European countries. For example, the Spanish
beauty contest yielded just 13 euros per head of population, but generated
considerable political and legal controversy and a widespread perception that
the outcome was both unfair and inefﬁcient, all problems that are typical of
such procedures (see section 6.2), while the difﬁculties with the French beauty
contest mean that France has not only missed its government’s originally
WHAT REALLY MATTERS IN AUCTION DESIGN 121planned date for allocation of the spectrum (already by a year at the time of
writing) but also missed EU deadlines.
In conclusion, the most important features of an auction are its robustness
against collusion and its attractiveness to potential bidders. Failure to attend to
these issues can lead to disaster. And anyone setting up an auction would be
foolish to blindly follow past successful designs; auction design is not ‘‘one
size ﬁts all’’. While the sealed-bid auction performs well in some contexts, and
the Anglo-Dutch auction is ideal in other contexts, the ascending auction has
also frequently been used very successfully. In the practical design of
auctions, local circumstances matter and the devil is in the details.
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